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ABSTRACT 
This study in recent history connects macroeconomic performance to financial policies in 
order to explain the decline in volatility of economic growth in the US since the mid-1980s, 
which is also known as the ‘Great Moderation’. Existing explanations attribute this to a 
combination of good policies, good environment, and good luck. This paper hypothesizes that 
before and during the Great Moderation, changes in the structure and regulation of US 
financial markets caused a redirection of credit flows, increasing the share of mortgage credit 
in total credit flows and facilitating the smoothing of volatility in GDP via equity withdrawal 
and a wealth effect on consumption. Institutional and econometric analysis is employed to 
assess these hypotheses. This yields substantial corroboration, lending support to a novel 
‘policy’ explanation of the Moderation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A small and expanding literature has recently addressed the dramatic decline in 
macroeconomic volatility of the US economy since the mid-1980s (Kim and Nelson 1999; 
McConnel and Perez-Quinos, 2000; Kahn et al, 2002; Summers, 2005; Owyiang et al, 2007). 
Blanchard and Simon (2001) noted declines in the standard deviation of quarterly growth and 
inflation by half and by two thirds, respectively, since 1984. Warnock et al (2000) 
documented strongly declining employment volatility. Bernanke (2004) drew broad attention 
to these trends by making it the topic of his 2004 Eastern Economic Association speech. 
While the bursting of the dotcom bubble punctured any belief in a permanent ‘end of boom 
and bust’, macroeconomic volatility to date has remained markedly lower than it was before 
1984. Many countries, particularly the Anglo-Saxon economies, share this feature. Table 1 
below shows that the average annual volatility of GDP growth halved from 0.012 in 1960-
1983 to 0.006 over 1984-20071. 
The evidence is now abundant, and studies have focused on explaining and 
interpreting the simultaneous decline in volatility of the key macroeconomic variables (see 
Cecchetti and Kraus, 2006 for an overview). The new stability poses two puzzles. Why did 
the trade-off between output volatility and inflation volatility break down, as evident in their 
joint decline for over two decades now? And why that decline itself? A third question taken 
up in some discussions of the Moderation concerns the link with America’s other salient 
macro features – foremost, the current account deficit (Fogli and Perri, 2006), but also 
bubbles in the stock markets (bursting in 1989 and 2000) and the real estate, credit 
derivatives, stock and currency  bubbles unwinding at the moment of writing. 

1
 The end data of 2007 is not to suggest that the Great Moderation ended in 2007 (although see Barnett and 
Chauvet’s November 2008 paper entitled  ‘The End of the Great Moderation?’) but for reasons of data accuracy. 
GDP revisions within a year of publication are often considerable. For instance, GNP announcement made by 
the US government at the start of quarter t on GDP growth in quarter t-1 were, on average over 1967-1991, 11.6 
% lower than the true GDP growth established some years later, after fully correcting for noise and incomplete 
data (Rodriguez Mora and Schulstad, 2007:1927, table 1). 
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Some writers argue that the greater stability signifies that the US economy entered a 
new phase around 1984. The nomer ‘Great Moderation’, reminiscent of America’s Great 
Depression and Great Inflation episodes, conveys this sense of a new era. The novel element 
is variously thought to be better monetary policy (Bernanke, 2004), better inventory 
management (McCarthy and Zakajsek, 2003), financial innovations (Dynan et al, 2005; 
Guerron, 2007), financial deregulation (Hull, 2003), and fundamental labour market changes 
as the Baby Boomer generation is aging (Jaimovic and Siu, 2006). Other analysts point to the 
role of chance and suggest that the volatility decline may well be due to smaller or less 
frequent shocks to the economy, quite outside the influence of policy makers. Most accounts 
allow for a mix of good policies, good environments and good luck (Ahmed et al, 2004). 
Consider each in turn. 
Bernanke (2004) offers a sophisticated explanation for the breakdown of the trade-off 
between output volatility and inflation volatility, as captured by a ’Taylor curve’. He points 
out that this trade-off only exists on the Taylor curve. If policy makers are sub-optimally 
operating below the curve, then better policies may lead to simultaneous improvements in the 
stability of both output and inflation, moving the economy closer to the curve. Alternatively, 
if the environment has become more stable since the mid-1980s (which, as Bernanke 
suggests, may itself be due to more predictable policies), then this would be reflected in a 
shifting out of the Taylor curve. Again, this creates room for policy makers to move nearer to 
it, at no cost to stability. In effect, this argument attributes the Moderation principally to better 
policies. This connects to the suggestion by Gali and Gambetti (2009) who identify the larger 
weight that monetary authorities gave to inflation stabilization as a cause of the Moderation. 
Another approach to detecting the sources of the Moderation is to look for 
fundamental changes simultaneous to it. Such coincident analyses have established that the 
start of the Great Moderation coincided with the ballooning of the US current account deficit. 
Fogli and Perri (2006) suggest that the Moderation was a causal factor for the deficit by 
weakening incentives for precautionary savings. Their model and evidence explain 20 % of 
deficit growth. Gali and Gambetti (2009:26) note that the Moderation has been accompanied 
by “large changes in the patterns of comovements of output, hours [worked] and labor 
productivity”. Stock and Watson (2002) find that the Moderation is principally attributable to 
smaller shocks, not to different monetary policy construed narrowly in terms of a Taylor rule, 
where only interest rate is the monetary policy instrument. This would be a ‘good 
environemnt’ (or ‘good luck’) explanation, rather than ‘good policy’. The Moderation also 
coincided with lesser ability of professional forecasters and the Fed to forecast inflation and 
 
real activity (D’Agostino et al, 2006). This suggests a break in the structure of the US 
economy that renders forecasting models obsolete. It supports that the Moderation is a ‘new 
era’ in US economic history indeed. 
In addressing the puzzles posed by the Moderation, this paper connects to the ‘policy’ 
and ‘environment’ explanations of the Moderation, and contributes to the coincident analysis 
literature. Its premise is that monetary policies and financial deregulation created a 
fundamental shift in the structure of the US economy, more conducive to macroeconomic 
stability. Because this shift occurred two decades ago and was not reversed, the present study 
also agrees with Bernanke (2004) that the environment has adapted to the new policies, 
reinforcing the lower volatility in output, employment and inflation. However, this paper does 
not represent the familiar position that the decisive change in policy was a combination of 
greater transparency and predictability by an inflation-targeting Fed. 
Instead, the key observation is that the start of the Moderation coincided with the start 
of other trends. These include a surge in bank credit creation (especially mortgage credit), a 
rise in property income, a rise in the consumption share of GDP, and a change in correlation 
(from positive to negative) between consumption and non-consumption GDP components. 
The suggested explanation is that a redirection of bank credit lending moderated GDP 
volatility by facilitating a larger role for wealth-based consumption in the US business cycle, 
cushioning shocks to the productive part of the economy. In short, this paper reconsiders the 
role of ‘credit in the macroeconomy’, to paraphrase a paper by Bernanke (1993). 
In the next section this explanation is developed in detail and located in the literature. 
Section provides a narrative account and quantitative assessment of the major trends in credit 
markets and in the macroeconomy during the Moderation. Section 4 offers an econometric 
analysis and section 5 concludes with a summing up and discussion. 
 
 
2. Credit Flows and the Moderation 
 
The central argument in this paper will be developed by considering a Keynesian-type ‘credit 
multiplier of income’, which captures the effect of credit flows on income growth. This is 
especially appropriate in the context of a study of reduced income volatility during the Great 
Moderation. Income multipliers were introduced by Keynes into the General Theory precisely 
in order to understand income volatility arising from changes in investment and employment 
(e.g., 1973 [1936]:118). As Hudson (1992:414) notes, ‘Keynes’ “multiplier” was a ratio 
 
indicating the income enhancing effect of injections of purchasing power’ - but Keynes’ 
analysis paid no explicit attention to how purchasing power is created, namely in the credit 
creation process. Hudson instead observes that “each country’s income multipliers might be 
increased by … leveraging the general credit superstructure. But Keynes himself did not draw 
this parallelism.” That is, one can define income multipliers not just for investment but also 
with respect to credit2, and trace how credit to different sectors may have different effects on 
income and income volatility. Keynes himself noted that his General Theory analysis -  while 
‘valuable in introducing order and method into our enquiry’- should take into account 
‘complicating factors’, among which he notes ‘how much of the new money is absorbed into 
the income and industrial circulations’ (1973 [1936]:298). The present analysis explicitly 
considers such ‘complicating factors’ by tracing how much of the ‘new money’ (that is, of 
fresh credit creation) is absorbed into ‘industrial circulations’ (that is, used in the real sector) 
and how much is related to leveraging, or debt creation – specifically, mortgage debt. A focus 
on leverage is justified also from a policy perspective since “the solution for a troubled 
economy is to regulate leverage, not interest”, as Geneakoplos (2009) notes. This position is 
detailed below. 
Keynesian income multipliers reflect the effect on growth in income (Y) due to (say) 
one Dollar of purchasing power injected into the economy, via what he generically named 
‘investment’ (I). This effect is captured in the multiplier Y/I, which is the inverse of the 
marginal propensity to save out of income (S/Y). Keynes so recognised that investment is 
the counterpart of saving. The innovation introduced in this paper is to make explicit that the 
counterpart of savings can be either real-sector investment which increases GDP and thus Y, 
or financial-sector investments3. These may detract from the credit flow available to support 
GDP growth via fixed capital formation, but may on the other hand stimulate GDP by 
facilitating consumption against increased asset values. To the extent that this ‘wealth effect 

2
 This multiplier would be different from the common ‘money multiplier’ which is restricted to some definition 
of money (M1, M2, M3, etc.) whereas credit includes money but also other forms of liquidity. A focus on the 
credit supply rather than on the money supply is justified since ‘the central means by which the banking systems 
(and the monetary authorities) affect the level of economic activity is through control of the availability of credit, 
not through the medium of exchange’ (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1988). 
3
 The conceptual distinction is that in the real sector, goods and services are produced and traded, while in the 
financial sector, wealth is managed by the creation and trade of financial instruments and assets (such as 
mortgages). Real-sector returns are profit and wages, while financial-sector returns are mostly asset price gains. 
The sectoral distinction parallels the distinction between income and wealth, and is fundamental to all national 
accounting – see e.g. the System of National Accounts standards produced by the OECD, to which all countries 
adhere in compiling their national accounts. Financial investment is all investment dealt with in the Financial 
Account, defined and described in chapter XI of the System of National Accounts. Unlike all other accounts in 
the System of National Accounts, the financial account does not have a balancing item that is carried forward to 
another account. In this sense, it is self-contained. 
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on consumption’4 runs countercyclical to the non-consumption part of GDP, it may allow for 
GDP smoothing. This effect may have been the cause of the lower volatility during the Great 
Moderation. The aim of the present paper is to develop this argument and test its implications.  
In analogy to the Keynesian income multiplier of investment, the effect of credit on 
growth may be traced in a ‘credit multiplier of income’ Y/K. This reflects the effect on 
growth in income (Y) of one dollar of credit (K) injected into the economy in the process of 
credit creation. The credit multiplier Y/K is the inverse of an economy’s propensity to lend 
out of income (K/Y). As (Werner e.g. 2005) emphasizes, total-credit flows can be 
decomposed into different types of credit flows (depending on the focus of analysis) and 
accordingly sectoral credit multipliers can be defined. In this paper the focus is on the case 
where K=M (for mortgages) and on the mortgage multiplier Y/M, the inverse of an 
economy’s propensity to convert savings out of income into mortgage credit (M/Y). The 
mortgage multiplier Y/M quantifies the increase in GDP due to an increase in mortgage 
debt, i.e. by ‘leveraging the credit superstructure’ (Hudson, 1992:214). This occurs when an 
overhead of financial-sector wealth reflected in increasing real estate prices (and its mirror 
image, debt) is superimposed on the real-sector economy through the creation and inflation of 
financial assets such as real estate and its derivative instruments. 
As noted, a positive effect on income and thus GDP of this leveraging runs via the 
‘wealth effect on consumption’, when individuals finance consumption against increased 
house prices. Catte et al (2004), building on other studies, estimate that the marginal 
propensity to consume out of housing wealth has been in the range of between 5 and 8 per 
cent in the United States during the Great Moderation years (and lower in most other OECD 
countries included in their study). During the Great Moderation, nominal US real estate 
values more than tripled, so that the ‘wealth effect’ would have induced an increase of 
consumption by between 15 and 24 per cent (in nominal values). To the extent that this 
wealth-induced consumption was countercyclical to other GDP components, this could lead to 
significant GDP smoothing. These figures are only indicative, but they suggest that the 
consumption effect due to real estate wealth would have been substantial and that the orders 
of magnitude are sufficient to warrant further exploration of the present hypothesis. 
In summary, the explanation suggested in this paper is that during the Great 
Moderation, changes in the structure and regulation of financial markets have caused a 
redirection of credit flows, boosting M credit both nominally and as share of total credit 

4
 Apart from the consumption smoothing effect, other financial-sector investments than mortgages also allow for 
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flows. Further, the claim is that changes in M ran counter-cyclically to other GDP 
components so that mortgage-driven consumption increased in times of lower growth (or 
contraction) of other GDP components. Moreover, for this explanation to be specific to the 
Great Moderation, this dampening effect should have been stronger during the Great 
Moderation than it was before. The institutional dimension of his explanation centres on 
financial deregulation. This policy increased both access to mortgage credit, and increased 
opportunities for equity withdrawal so that mortgage credit could lead to higher consumption 
levels. Figure one depicts this account in one flow chart. Below we explicitly formulate the 
hypotheses implied in this account of the Great Moderation 

the smoothing of investment decisions. These fall outside the scope f the present study. 
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Figure 1: Mortgage-Backed Consumption Cushioned of Shocks to GDP  
 
Notes to Figure 1: Fat arrows indicate chronological sequence. Thin arrows indicate causality. Text in ovals 
indicates variable changes, text in rectangles indicates context 
 
Hypothesis 1: During the Great Moderation, changes in the structure and regulation of US 
financial markets have caused a redirection of credit flows, facilitating an increasing share of 
mortgage credit in total credit flows. 
 
A second hypothesis is that the economy’s propensity to convert savings out of income into 
mortgage credit (M/Y) increased during the Great Moderation (denoted t1) compared to 
the years before (denoted t0), so that the mortgage multiplier of income (Y/M) declined: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Y/M
 t1 < Y/M to 
 
A third hypothesis is that growth in private consumption was countercyclical to growth in 
other GDP components during the Great Moderation, and more so than before. GDP (Y) is 
defined as 
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Y = C + I + G + E-M 
 
where C denotes private consumption, I denotes investment, G denotes government 
consumption, and E and M denote export and import, respectively. Let N denote the total of 
non-private consumption GDP components (N = I + G + E - M) so that the correlation 
coefficient s is 
 
s = corr (C,N) 
 
Hypothesis 3: s
 t1 < 0  and s t1 < s to 
 
A fourth hypothesis is that the house wealth effect on consumption increased, that is, 
consumption growth (C) during the Great Moderation was more strongly determined (in 
some function f) by mortgage growth (M) than was the case before: 
 
Hypothesis 4: (C)t= ft(Mt)  where f’t1> 0 and f’t1> f’t0 
 
A fifth hypothesis, following from the above, is that GDP volatility (denoted VGDP) was some 
function g of consumption C - i.e. C caused VGDP, - such that VGDP was decreasing in C, 
more so during the Great Moderation than before:   
 
Hypothesis 5: (VGDP)t= gt(Mt)  where g’t1< 0 and g’t1< g’t0 
 
Sections 3 and 4 below are an empirical assessment of these hypotheses. The remainder of 
this section first locates this explanation in the contemporary literature. This study fits into a 
strand of literature where credit is a key factor in understanding the macroeconomy, 
especially cyclicality and volatility (Bernanke 1993; Bernanke and Blinder 1998; Bliss and 
Kaufmann, 2003). While most contemporary work on credit and the macroeconomy is in the 
sprit of the Credit View (Bernanke and Gertler, 1993) or some variety of an accelerator model 
(Kyotaki and Moore, 1997), the present emphasis is on the more traditional notion of credit as 
the prime source of liquidity, enabling agents to finance expenditures (as also in Borio and 
Lowe, 2004). 
 
But this study deviates from the mainstream approach by asserting that the credit 
multiplier can durably affect growth and its volatility. This is contra the Credit View, notably 
its best known proponent Bernanke, who warned against treating ‘credit aggregates as an 
independent causal factor affecting the economy’ or a ‘primitive driving force’ (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995:34,44)5. 
This paper follows the Kocherlakota (2000) argument that credit constraints can create 
cycles, and extends this to the logically equivalent argument that looser credit policies can 
create stability. It thus also connects to the literature which views business cycles (partly) as 
credit cycles (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Mendicino, 2007). In support, Benk et al (2005), 
building on Uhlig (2003), identify credit shocks as candidate shocks that matter in 
determining GDP. Kyotaki (1998) explains how the credit system intermediates and amplifies 
technology or wealth shocks into output movements.Caporale and Howells (2001) analyse 
the interactions between bank loans, bank deposits and total transactions in the economy. 
They conclude that “loans cause deposits and that those deposits cause an expansion of 
wealth/GDP transactions” (Caporale and Howells, 2001:555).  Note that the present paper has 
no issue with Moore (1988; 1991) and the Post-Keynesian literature following it on money 
endogeneity, which argues that the total quantity of credit money supplied should be regarded 
as endogenously demand-determined. This view is quite independent of the question 
considered here, whether that credit-money, once created endogenously or otherwise, will 
then affect GDP movements. Such causality is contested – Koopman et al (2006), for 
instance, argue that GDP growth causes the credit cycle. 
This paper is also focused on loan volumes rather than interest rates; Lown and 
Morgan (2006) show that loan volumes – determined largely by credit standards and 
regulation – dominate loan rates in explaining output. Arestis and Sawyer (2006; 2008) 
likewise question how effective interest rates are. Geanakoplos (2009:9) calls for an end to 
“the obsession with interest rates” in more attention to the “leverage cycle”. All these studies 
use some measure for the total credit supply, without the disaggregation adopted in this paper. 
With regard to specification, it connects to work by Werner (1997, 2005) who 
disaggregated credit flows into real-sector and financial-sector flows in his study of the 
Japanese boom of the 1980s and the subsequent slump. The key insight was that economic 
performance measures can be linked to the distribution of bank credit over different sectors of 

5
 Bernanke adds that ‘in a previous life, [he] has performed similar exercises. Mea culpa’, referring to his (1983) 
study of the Great Depression. 
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the economy. This suggests that rather than a ‘quantity theory of money’ as the workhorse 
model for studying real-financial interactions, a ‘quality theory of credit’6 may be useful, 
since ‘the central means by which the banking system (and the monetary authorities) affect 
the level of economic activity is through control of the availability of credit, not through the 
medium of exchange’ (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1988). Likewise, Austrian economists attribute 
errors in mainstream analysis at root to theorists’ ”confusing the demand for credit with the 
demand for money” (Yeager and Greenfield 1997). The present study of the US builds on this 
by assigning a special role within the total-credit flow to mortgage credit, and by making a 
connection to the volatility of GDP growth. 
Closely related papers are by Campbell (2005) who poses a link between rapid growth 
and increased volatility in credit flows to financial markets and stability in the real economy; 
and  Lorrain (2006) who finds that the volatility of industrial output is lower in countries with 
more bank credit. This paper suggests that the ability of banks to pool and diversify shocks 
helps achieve volatility dampening via countercyclical borrowing. But Lorrain does not 
distinguish between the uses of credit which, as will be shown below, considerably increases 
the explanatory power of the model. Another related idea is by Freeman and Kydland (2000) 
who suggest that the correlation between a variety of monetary indicators and real output 
results from endogenously determined fluctuations in the money multiplier, rather than from 
causal influence of money on output. But they do not specify the cause of these fluctuations. 
The present paper goes further by asserting a causal influence of credit-money on output. It 
also shows that what Freeman and Kydland (2000) label ‘fluctuations in the money 
multiplier’ may well be caused by the changing composition of credit flows, expressed in the 
mortgage multiplier. 
 
3. The Great Moderation: Trends in Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy 
 
This section provides an institutional account and quantitative assessment of trends in 
financial markets and the US economy before and during the Great Moderation. This 
constitutes an empirical assessment of the qualitative Hypothesis 1 that during the Great 
Moderation, changes in the structure and regulation of financial markets have caused a 
redirection of credit flows, boosting M credit flows. 
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From the early 1980s, financial market deregulation in the context of the freeing of the 
US Dollar from convertibility a decade earlier freed the banking system to step up dollar 
creation. This was thus an incentive to banks for increased loan extension. But demand for 
liquidity from the real sector was constrained by the volatile and high interest rates of the 
period, as policymakers used vigorous interest rate management in the battle against inflation. 
These high and volatile costs of capital were a drag on real-sector investment and 
consumption but stimulated lending and financial arbitrage. Additionally, US financial-
market deregulation in the early 1980s inaugurated a rise in credit to financial markets 
generally and to mortgage markets specifically. ‘Regulation Q’, which capped the interest 
rates at which banks where allowed to loan funds, was phased out over some years in the 
early 1980s. Simultaneously in the non-bank financial sector, large institutional changes were 
opening up new investment opportunities, particularly in the household loans and mortgage 
market. The newly deregulated Savings & Loans market, for instance, absorbed 
unprecedented volumes of savings during the second half of the 1980s, directing them into 
mortgage credit. From the mid-1990s the technology stock bubble attracted large liquidity 
flows into what, in retrospect and despite appearances, were not real-sector but financial-
sector investments, speculating on asset price increases. The dotcom bubble in stock markets 
also stimulated financial innovations which survived its puncturing, and which would 
facilitate the fast leveraging processes observed during subsequently maturing bubbles in 
derivatives, currency trade and housing. 
The 1999 repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act was another milestone in financial-
sector stimulation. ‘Glass-Steagall’ was motivated by the over-leveraging practices that 
preceded the 1929 stock market crash. Among other things, it aimed to separate banking 
proper – that is taking in deposits and creating credit– from wealth investment and money 
management. Glass-Steagall regulation meant that bank loans would stay on the books of the 
lender bank, which was responsible for loan collection or, alternatively, would have to 
shoulder default costs. Its 1999 repeal, in contrast, allowed banks to make out loans and then 
sell them, typically to a pension fund or other institutional investor. This freed banks from 
much of the loan risk. It also allowed banks to make profits more from fees collected when 
making out the loan than from safely collecting the loan. Both these changes – lower risk to 
the lending bank and profits from the number of loan transactions rather than from low risk-
corrected returns - induced banks to increase lending volumes. Such deregulation also 

6
 I thank Chris Meakin for suggesting the term. 
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stimulated the market for credit derivatives which sliced, sorted, repackaged, and insured 
loans in order to increase their tradability. 
These policies and developments brought a marked change in the composition of 
credit flows and in the relation between consumption and production in the US economy from 
the mid-1980s, the start of Great Moderation. Capital gains made in financial markets and on 
house prices compared well to real-sector profitability, rationalising continuous mortgage 
credit extension. Thus the growth in mortgage lending became self propelled, and continued 
even after the initial conditions that had started it, had changed (Shiller, 2006). These 
observations are in line with the suggestion that the decisive shift in monetary policy that 
inaugurated the Moderation was a new interest rate regime combined with financial 
deregulation. 
The Great Moderation was characterized by six developments that support the above 
account. They are jointly illustrated in Table 1 (all data are taken from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis).  
 
Table 1: Trends in Credit and the Macroeconomy Before and During the US Great 
Moderation 
 
(decade averages) 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s* 
     
Consumption** 
(% GDP) 
62.4 64.3 67.0 69.9 
     
correlation of consumption growth with 
non-consumption growth (coefficient)** 
25.4 -35.8 -35.8 -40.4 
     
total credit stock outstanding 
(% GDP) 
147.3 186.1 236.7 297.0 
     
Mortgage credit stock outstanding 
(% GDP) 
14.5 29.1 54.9 96.3 
     
Real-sector credit stock outstanding 
(% GDP) 
0.87 1.02 1.20 1.17 
     
Income from property 
(% GDP) 
30.0 41.7 40.5 38.9 
     
Volatility of GDP growth 
(annual s.d., '000) 
 
10.5 11.4 5.4 6.3 
Note: all decadal figures are unweighted averages calculated from nominal quarterly data. 
 * The 2000s include the 8 years of 2000 to 2007. 
 
** The ‘non-consumption’ part of GDP comprises investment, export and government expenditures; 
the ‘consumption’ part includes private consumption. ‘Correlation’ is a two-year moving average of 
correlations between quarterly observations. 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
First, the share of consumption in GDP, which had been virtually stable between 60 % and 63 
% from 1953 to 1981, rose from 64 % in 1982 to 70 % in 2001-2007. Historically, this was a 
rapid increase. 
Second, shocks to the investment, export and government expenditures components of 
GDP (N) were increasingly counterbalanced by opposite movements in private consumption 
(C). The claim of this paper is that as a result of this balancing act, the average annual 
volatility of GDP growth halved from 0.012 in 1960-1983 to 0.006 over 1984-20077. This 
mechanism whereby decreases in N were offset by increases in C (and vice versa) was the 
more effective in smoothing GDP because of the increase in the consumption share already 
noted. One way to measure the significance of this balancing mechanism is by the correlation 
coefficient s between N and C growth (in differences). This measure was a positive +0.25 in 
the 1970s but turned into a negative -0.36 to -0.40 from the 1980s onwards, corroborating 
hypothesis 3 above. Significantly, most of the decline occurred around the start of Great 
Moderation in the mid-1980s. As these averages hide great variation, another way to illustrate 
this difference is to look at the percentage of two-yearly moving average correlation 
coefficients that was negative in each decade. This was only 30 % in the 1970s, but 77 % in 
the 1980s, 92 % in the 1990s and 90 % in the 2000s. This demonstrates that for most of the 
Great Moderation years, declines in the investment, net export and/or government 
expenditures were balanced by increases in private consumption.  
The liquidity that facilitated the increase in consumption was provided by increases in 
the total bank credit stock, which doubled in relative terms from 1.5 times GDP in the 1970s 
to 3 times GDP in the 2000s. Thus the credit multiplier of income decreased strongly during 
the Great Moderation (as in hypothesis 2). The rise in credit creation was largely due to the 
most important category of credit with regard to the domestic US economy, the stock of 
mortgage credit. This rose from just 3 % of GDP in the early 1950s to 30 % of GDP in 1985 

7
 The end date of 2007 is not to suggest that the Great Moderation ended in 2007 (although see Barnett and 
Chauvet’s November 2008 paper entitled ‘The End of the Great Moderation?’) but for reasons of data accuracy. 
GDP revisions within a year of publication are often considerable. For instance, GNP announcement made by 
the US government at the start of quarter t on GDP growth in quarter t-1 were, on average over 1967-1991, 11.6 
% lower than the true GDP growth established some years later, after fully correcting for noise and incomplete 
data (Rodriguez Mora and Schulstad, 2007:1927, table 1). 
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and on to an average 96 % in the 2000s. By the time of the latest observation in 2007Q4, the 
employment of bank credit for leveraging assets by mortgaging them had become about 
equally important (111 % of GDP) as its role in supporting real-sector transactions (121 % of 
GDP). Credit stocks in the real sector also increased at the start of the Great Moderation, but 
by only about 20 %. This difference with mortgage (and other financial) credit growth reflects 
the changing structure of the US economy. 
The transition to a new growth regime can also be seen in the rise in income from 
property as a share of GDP: from 25 % in the 1960s and 30 % in the 1970s to around 40 % in 
the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Again, most of that increase occurred at the start of the 1980s. In 
the four years 1978-1982, income from property rose from 31 % to 42 % of GDP, then stayed 
at that level. It has since been fluctuating between 35 % and 45 %, with little variation in most 
years. The shift in the US economic structure is also reflected in the observation that while 
property income shares increased by two thirds (from 25 % to 40 %) from the 1960 to the 
2000s, the share of wage incomes was stable at precisely 57 % of GDP throughout. 
In brief, a number of structural changes occurred within a few years in the early 
1980s, the start of the Great Moderation: the credit-to-GDP ratio increased in the real sector 
by 20 %; the growth in the mortgage-to-GDP ratio accelerated; property incomes and 
consumption levels both moved to a higher plateau; and GDP volatility halved. As will be 
analysed more rigorously below, the picture that emerges from these explorations is that 
negative shocks in the non-private consumption (investment, export and government 
expenditures) components of GDP were systematically accompanied by growth in private 
consumption, supported by property income growth linked to increases in mortgage credit 
levels. 
 
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
 
In order to assess hypotheses 4 and 5, a model will now be developed reflecting the relations 
set out in Figure 1 above. These are the mortgage - consumption relation (Cons)t= ft(Mt) 
(with f’t1> 0 and f’t1> 0 f’t0 ) and the consumption – GDP volatility relation (VGDP)t= 
gt(Const) (where g’t1< 0 and g’t1< g’t0). The model captures a cointegrated relationship 
between the volatility of GDP, mortgage credit, and consumption, in a vector autoregression 
analysis. Such a multi-equation framework is preferable over a single-equation approach as 
causality between both types of credit and GDP is a priori ambiguous; and indeed most 
 
analyses of causes of the Great Moderation employ a cointegration approach such as Vector 
Auto-Regression (VAR) analysis. GDP volatility is defined as the annual standard deviation 
of quarterly nominal growth in GDP. Mortgage credit growth and consumption growth are 
defined as the annual average of quarterly year-on-year growth, in nominal US Dollars. All 
variables are calculated over non-overlapping intervals of 4 quarters. After differencing once, 
a Philips-Perron test indicates that the transformed variables satisfy the short term stationarity 
requirement at the 1 % confidence level (note that this does not exclude any long-term 
cointegration relationship). 
This model so estimates the interrelationship between three variables (mortgage credit 
flows, consumption growth and GDP volatility, all in differences) in a three–equation Vector 
Auto-Regression (VAR) framework with 3 lags (as indicated by Akaike and Schwartz 
information criteria), for the 24 years of the Great Moderation (1984-2007) and the 24 years 
preceding it (1960-1983). Formally, this model is the reduced form of the dynamic 
simultaneous equations of GDP volatility y, mortgage credit growth m and consumption 
growth c in three VAR(3) equations: 
 
yt = v + A(1i)yt-i + A(2i)mt-i + A(3i)ct-i + et   (t = 1,2, … 24; i= 1,2, 3) 
 
where yt, v and et are all 3x1 vectors, A(i) are coefficient matrices of size 3 x 3, and et is white 
noise. The model is dynamic in that it relates each of the three variables GDP volatility, 
mortgage credit growth and consumption growth in year t to their own lags in years t-1 to t-6, 
and six lags of the other two variables. This captures that it takes time for credit flows to have 
their effects on GDP volatility. Lagging allows for assessment of the causality between 
variables, defined by temporal sequence in the sense of Granger. No parameter restrictions are 
imposed a priori as in a structural VAR, since such restrictions would lack a clear theoretical 
basis (although below in defining Impulse Response Functions, orderings will be implicitly 
imposed, justified by Granger causality patterns). This is the basic model; below additional 
variables are added to probe the robustness of findings. 
 This analysis is conducted separately for the Great Moderation and for the pre-Great 
Moderation years. The start of the Great Moderation in this time series is defined to be in 
1984 as in most studies (though variations in this starting date are explored below). As no one 
has yet announced the end of the Great Moderation (though see Barnett and Chauvet, 2008), 
the full time series from 1984 to 2007 is utilized. The analysis is conducted separately for the 
Great Moderation and the years preceding it. The pre-Great Moderation period is defined to 
 
be the 24 observations preceding 1984, from 1960 to 1983, so as to preserve symmetry in the 
number of observations in the pre- and post-1984 analyses. 
 
Individual estimated coefficients and tests for Granger causality were studied and, while of 
the expected size and significance, they give only an initial indication of the effects of interest 
since these are the net results of interactions in the system. These effects are better explored in 
graphs of the orthogonalized impulse response functions resulting from the VAR analyses, for 
the relations of interest. This requires Choleski decomposed vectors which imply an ordering 
in the VAR. E.g. with an x-over-y Choleski vector, it is implied that x drives y, so that a 
structure is imposed on the VAR. This may be misleading if in reality causality between x and 
y is unclear, or runs in reverse direction. Sims (1980) suggested that an implicit ordering may 
be justified by Granger causality from x to y. A second check on correct ordering is by model 
averaging. Orthogonalized impulse response functions from x to y and from y to x are 
estimated, and the net effect calculated to suggest the correct ordering8. 
 
We first study causality patterns. Before the GREAT MODERATION, no causality at all can 
be detected  (using a 1 % level of significance for the Chi-square statistic of the Granger 
causality test). During the GREAT MODERATION, there is unidirectional causality from 
mortgages to consumption, from consumption to GDP volatility, and from mortgages to GDP 
volatility. The first two relations are as expected. The latter suggests that mortgages may have 
affected GDP volatility also in other ways than through consumption; but below we will see 
that this is not confirmed by impulse response graphs. It is noteworthy that mortgages are not 
Granger caused within the system. This is in line with the institutional description of 
mortgage growth as exogenously caused by policy choices. These causality patterns motivate 
the formulation of impulse response functions in the GREAT MODERATION from 
mortgages to higher consumption (graph 2), from higher consumption to lower GDP volatility 
(graph 3), and directly from mortgages to GDP volatility. The latter relation turned out to 
yield no significant effects and is not shown here (but available on request). For purposes of 
comparison, in each graph these relations are also estimated for the pre-GREAT 
MODERATION years. Figure 2 captures the wealth effect on consumption, showing the 
effect on consumption growth of a one-unit shock in mortgage growth in the eight years 
following it. Figure 3 report the effect on GDP volatility of a one-unit shock in consumption 

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. I thank Kelvin Balcombe for drawing my attention to this point 
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growth in the eight years following it.. The black lines are forecasts based on parameter point 
estimates; the grey areas are 99 % confidence intervals. 
 
 
 

 
 
Figure 2: Effect of a shock in mortgage credit growth on consumption growth during the 
Great Moderation (1984-2007, top) and before (1960-1983, bottom). 
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Figure 3: Effect of a shock in consumption growth on GDP volatility during the Great 
Moderation (1984-2007, top) and before (1960 -1983, bottom). 
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The Graph results are as hypothesized. The wealth effect on consumption via mortgaging is 
positive during the Great Moderation but insignificant before the Great Moderation. A 
positive shock to consumption growth caused no significant increase in GDP volatility before 
the Great Moderation but a significant, immediate and short-term decrease in volatility during 
the Great Moderation – just as the simple correlation coefficients in Table 1 would lead one to 
expect. 
 
A number of robustness checks were undertaken. First, models with fewer and more lags, 
anmd with different lag structures, were estimated. This yielded qualitatively similar results, 
but with larger loss of information as indicated by Akaike and Schwartz information criteria. 
Second, the cut off date of the Great Moderation is debatable, as several of its key trends 
started already in 1982. But varying the starting data between 1981 and 1984 did not change 
the findings. Third, control variables which are likely to additionally influence GDP volatility 
were added to the model; this were GDP growth and growth in total credit (both in first 
differences. The assumption that we so test is that higher GDP growth levels, or more credit 
available generally may also smooth consumption variations, so reducing GDP volatility, 
without a special role for mortgage-backed consumption. But including either or both in the 
system (so estimating 4 or 5 equations, respectively) did not change the key findings that 
during the Great Moderation, GDP volatility significantly decreases with a positive shock in 
consumption and that consumption significantly increases with a positive shock to mortgages. 
This is a finding in line with the conventional contention that ‘credit aggregates are no 
independent causal factor affecting the economy’ (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995:34,44); but as 
noted this ignores the possibility that categories of credit do have causal effects on the 
economy. A generalist approach to studying credit aggregates simply is not fine grained 
enough.  
 
Another check was to include as control variables other categories of the total credit flow than 
mortgage credit. This was undertaken for: credit to the real sector (i.e. all credit extended to 
non-financial firms and households, excluding mortgages) and credit to the financial sector 
other than mortgages (i.e. all credit extended to non-financial firms). The real-sector credit 
measure excludes a wealth effect on consumption through collateralized lending, but it 
includes consumption credit to households. The assumption that is so tested is that 
consumption credit rather than mortgages was a driving force in moderating GDP volatility. 
The financial-sector measure tests the assumption that others financial assets than real estate 
 
have been supporting consumption and moderated GDP volatility. In both these 
specifications, the positive effect of a mortgage credit shock on consumption during the Great 
Moderation remains positive but is insignificant;  and there is a significant positive effect of a 
shock in real or financial credit on consumption, with a two-year lag. This finding is robust to 
including GDP growth as control variable and to varying the starting year of the Great 
Moderation. However, when omitting mortgage credit growth variable from the system (i.e. 
replacing it with real-sector or financial-sector credit growth rather than adding real-sector 
credit growth) there is a significant stimulus to consumption from real-sector credit but not 
from (non-mortgage) financial-sector credit. Also, the negative effect of consumption on GDP 
volatility completely disappears in both specifications. Moreover, real-sector credit (but not 
financial-credit) flows also significantly stimulated consumption in the 1960-1983 years 
before the Great Moderation. This exercise suggests that both real-sector, non-collateralised 
credit flows and credit flows to financial asset markets (other than real estate) sustained 
consumption levels during the Great Moderation alongside mortgage credit flows, but that the 
moderating effect on GDP volatility ran uniquely though mortgaging. This is understandable 
in light of the flexibility in timing of house equity withdrawals, which can more easily be 
made to run counter-cyclically to shocks to other GDP components. Also, the role of 
mortgages in moderating GDP volatility was apparently specific to the Great Moderation 
while the effect of real-sector credit was not. 
 
Finally, it may be argued that taking 1961-1983 as the ‘pre-Great Moderation’ era is wrong, 
as it includes structural breaks in US monetary policy, especially around 1969-1973. One way 
to probe this is to restrict the analysis to the post-1969 years and dividing them equally in 
1970-1988 and 1989-2007. The drawbacks are that this allows for only a much smaller set of 
observations; it also times the start of the Great Moderation incorrectly. Still, analyses using 
this periodization give identical results to the periodization with 1984 as break point. The 
results are not sensitive to the choice of periodization. 
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this study of the Great Moderation in the US it was suggested that volatility in GDP and 
inflation originating from supply side shocks has increasingly been cushioned by 
contributions of rising asset prices to purchasing power. This development is reflected in the 
 
changing composition of credit aggregates and linked to wider macroeconomic developments. 
This explanation is presented in terms of a ‘mortgage multiplier of income’, which decreased 
as mortgage credit flows relative to GDP rose, so moderating GDP fluctuations. Testable 
hypothesis following from this account were developed and empirical evidence in support 
was presented, both in terms of institutional description and quantitative explorations and in 
the form of a formal test in a VAR framework.  
 Theoretically, this research supports an approach to studying credit and monetary 
problems which focuses on not just the money supply but the broader credit supply, and on 
specific categories of credit within it. In understanding the macroeconomic effect of credit, it 
matters what the additional liquidity is used for. This study also demonstrates how the 
economy responds differently, over time, to that liquidity supply, owing to changes in the 
institutions underpinning it. A more generalist approach lacking these features and studying 
aggregate credit flows or time invariant relations is found to be unhelpful. 
 One loose end to this analysis is the relation of this analysis to other features of the US 
economy during the Great Moderation.  The rise in consumption was sustained by increasing 
trade deficits, and a natural question for follow-up research is to what extend the deficit was 
supported by mortgage credit flows. Another question relates to the decreased inflation 
characteristic of the Great Moderation. This is somewhat of a puzzle as the Moderation was 
an era of an unprecedented rise in liquidity, yet unusually low and stable inflation. Most 
liquidity led to asset inflation not inflation in the consumer price index. While some observers 
have pointed out that this may have been artificial to some degree due to redefinitions of the 
consumer price index (e.g. using hedonic pricing methods), this is unlikely to fully account 
for low inflation. A question for future research is therefore who the structure of financial 
markets have facilitated asset price inflation without large spill-overs into prices of goods and 
services. A link with the deficit is plausible, as increasing imports may have helped keep 
prices low.  
Finally, how does the present analysis alter the assessment of the Great Moderation? 
In this account the reduced volatility in GDP of the Great Moderation was an (unintended?) 
consequence of a new growth regime (more heavily dependent on consumption and the 
financial structures supporting it), rather than a specific policy. It was therefore pervasive 
rather than specific, and not easily pinned down. It also created tranquility alongside 
mounting imbalances in household balance sheets. One may speculate that such sedative 
collateral effects constitute one reason why the downsides of this growth mode were not 
widely appreciated during the Great Moderation. Keynes (1973[1936]:118), in a discussion of 
 
employment multipliers and the fluctuations in employment resulting from changes in 
investment, complained that ‘[u]nfortunately the fluctuations have been sufficient to prevent 
the nature of the malady from being obvious, whilst its severity is such that it cannot be 
remedied unless its nature is understood.’ Likewise, the lack of fluctuations, the tranquility in 
GDP that characterized the Great Moderation, may have prevented a more critical attitude to 
the sustainability of the growth regime that underpinned it. Instead, it led to self-
congratulatory assessments by policy makers that the lower volatility was due partly to ‘good 
policy’. Even the apparent breakdown of that tranquility during 2007-2008 in the so-called 
global ‘credit crisis’ triggered debate on specific aberrations in financial markets rather than a 
broad based discussion on the growth regime that had channelled resources away from the 
real sector and into asset-backed consumption over the preceding quarter century. Yet just as 
Keynes wrote in the above quote, ’it cannot be remedied unless its nature is understood.’ This 
study has sought to support the development of this understanding, and to demonstrate its use 
in assessing recent economic history. 
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